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Abstract 
Household indebtedness has risen sharply in recent years, with large increases in 
both secured and unsecured borrowing. In this paper, waves 5 and 10 of the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for 1995 and 2000 are used to examine the determinants of 
participation in the unsecured debt market and the amount borrowed. Probit models for 
participation are estimated and age, income, positive financial prospects and housing tenure 
are found to be very significant and have the expected sign according to a life-cycle model for 
consumption. Regressions to explain the level of borrowing by individuals suggest that 
income is the main variable explaining cross-sectional differences in unsecured debts. 
The increase in aggregate unsecured debt between 1995 and 2000 does not seem 
to be closely linked to changes in the determinants of debt market participation and has been 
mainly associated with the larger amounts borrowed by those with debts. Increases in 
income, better educational qualifications and improved prospects regarding the financial 
situation contributed to this result. The major part of the overall increase in unsecured debt is 
not explained by variables at the individual level, but is accounted for by common, 
unmodelled macroeconomic factors. 
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 Summary 
Unsecured borrowing by households, mainly in the form of personal loans, overdrafts and 
credit cards, has grown rapidly over the past ten years or so. This has raised concerns that it 
could cause widespread financial difficulties and default among households who might 
struggle to keep up with their debt repayments. The validity of such concerns will depend to a 
large extent on the type of people who have increased their indebtedness and whether they 
are borrowing more because their economic circumstances have changed and they feel more 
confident about taking on additional financial commitments. Borrowing for these reasons is 
unlikely to be as risky as increased borrowing without a change in underlying economic 
conditions. 
This paper examines survey evidence on the determinants and distribution of 
unsecured debt using waves 5 and 10 for 1995 and 2000 of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS). Previous work in the Bank has used the BHPS to analyse the overall financial 
position of households, including the distribution of unsecured debt across different income 
and age groups. This paper looks in more detail at the determinants of the cross-sectional 
distribution of unsecured debt and whether this distribution has changed over time. That 
makes it possible to assess whether unsecured debt has increased because the factors 
determining its use have changed or whether more debt is held for given circumstances. 
One of the key risks associated with unsecured debt is that it is increasingly used by 
high risk borrowers. Despite the increased prevalence of credit cards, there is no evidence 
from the BHPS that participation in the unsecured debt market rose between 1995 and 2000. 
In both years, around 39% of people claimed to have some debt in this form. These may not 
be the same people, as the BHPS suggests that 35% of the most indebted quartile in 1995 
had no unsecured debt in 2000. But the evidence suggests that there has been no 
substantial change in the factors that determine whether an individual is likely to have 
unsecured debt or not. 
In line with standard life-cycle considerations, econometric analysis indicates that the 
main determinant of the participation decision is the age of the borrower, with 20 to 30-year 
olds most likely to borrow unsecured. Other statistically significant factors are income, 
economic prospects, qualifications, job status, housing status and the extent of mortgage 
borrowing. 
While there is no clear statistical evidence of a change in the determinants of 
participation in the unsecured credit market between 1995 and 2000, there was, though, a 
striking increase in the amount of debt held by borrowers between these two years. 
According to econometric estimates, the main determinant of the level of unsecured 
borrowing of borrowers is the level of individual income. Age seems to be less important in 
determining the amount of unsecured borrowing than the decision to participate in the 
unsecured market. The other statistically significant determinants of the amount of borrowing 
are economic prospects, qualifications, job status, housing status and the extent of mortgage 
borrowing. But, as with the participation decision, there is little evidence of a major change in 
the importance of these determinants between 1995 and 2000, although there does appear 
to have been a slight increase in the relative borrowing of those with high incomes. Instead, 
the main change between these years has been an increase in the amount borrowed 
throughout the distribution. This suggests that factors affecting all current and potential 
borrowers, regardless of their personal characteristics, were most important in explaining the 
rise in unsecured debt between 1995 and 2000. 
 Thus the rise in unsecured borrowing appears not to have been concentrated within 
poor risk groups, but to have been a general phenomenon affecting those likely to be 
borrowers to a similar extent. While it is not possible, on the basis of the information available, 
to explain the cause of this shift, it is consistent with lower rates of interest on unsecured 
debt. According to the theory outlined in this paper, lower rates on unsecured debt would 
raise both the unsecured and secured borrowing of those unable to borrow as much as they 
would like at secured interest rates, without encouraging further borrowing by those who are 
unlikely to participate in the unsecured market. This would improve the welfare of those who 
had been constrained by enabling them to spread their spending more smoothly over time. 
Of course, more unsecured debt involves greater risks even if debt is not 
concentrated among high risk groups. Some individuals do have very high levels of debt in 
relation to their income and that exposes them to the risk that they will not be able to repay. 
But there is no evidence that this situation worsened between 1995 and 2000. 
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1 Introduction 
Borrowing by UK households has risen rapidly in recent years and by the end of 2004 the 
overall amount owed was worth over 140% of annual post-tax income. The majority of this 
debt is accounted for by mortgages, secured on the borrower’s home, but the proportion 
that is unsecured had reached around 20% of household income, almost double what it was 
in 1994. 
Unsecured debt, mainly in the form of credit cards, overdrafts and personal loans, 
differs from secured debt in terms of its purposes, cost, flexibility and risk. Traditionally, its 
main purpose has been to finance durable consumption while secured debt has financed 
house purchase, but the purposes for which debt is used are changing. During the 1990s, 
more use was made of unsecured debt to finance holidays, clothing or special occasions1 
while secured debt increasingly financed consumption through mortgage equity withdrawal 
[see Davey (2001)]. These developments suggest that debt is much less closely related to 
particular purchases than in the past. 
One of the factors behind shifts in the composition of borrowing is likely to be 
changes in the price at which people are able to borrow. Usually, unsecured borrowing is 
more expensive because of the greater risk to lenders in the absence of collateral. The greater 
availability of secured borrowing on better terms would therefore encourage mortgage equity 
withdrawal and the widespread substitution of secured for unsecured debt.  However, there is 
also an increasing amount of aggregate unsecured debt that does not bear any explicit 
interest, arising from purchases offering interest-free credit or from the use of credit cards that 
do not bear interest if settled at the end of each month.  This would tend to encourage the 
substitution of unsecured for secured debt. That both types of borrowing have risen rapidly at 
the same time suggests that these relative price effects may have offset each other. But it 
also carries with it the possibility that the risk of unsecured lending has changed as the 
characteristics of borrowers have altered. 
Recent research at the Bank of England [May, Tudela and Young (2004)] has 
described the distribution of unsecured and secured debt across households in Britain as of 
September 2004 using a specially commissioned survey. This paper attempts to go further 
and assess what lies behind the greater use of unsecured debt by British households, since 
this potentially has implications for both macroeconomic and financial stability. It does this by 
means of a detailed investigation of the determinants of borrowing at the individual level using 
information from the 1995 and 2000 waves of the BHPS. This attempts to clarify the type of 
factors that influence borrowing and whether the importance of these factors has changed 
over time. Is it that people are borrowing more because they feel more confident about the 
future, or is it simply more convenient for them to finance spending in this way? What are the 
characteristics of borrowers and have these changed recently? 
Overall levels of borrowing can be analysed using life-cycle permanent income 
hypothesis models, where debt allows individuals to smooth consumption over the life cycle 
and to finance the purchase of assets such as houses and consumer durables. Changing 
levels of borrowing can then be explained within this framework as a response to factors 
affecting spending, taking into account credit constraints and other supply-side factors that 
might influence the way in which spending is financed. In this paper we extend this model to 
take account of differences between secured and unsecured debt. Because secured debt is 
                                                                          
1. Information on the purposes of unsecured borrowing is available from surveys of borrowers. The weight of durable 
consumption as the end-use of unsecured debt decreased from near 68% in 1995 to around 54% in 2002. Meanwhile, 
the weight of the financing of holidays, clothes and special occasions increased from below 3% of the stock of 
unsecured debt in 1995 to near 10% in 2002. While it cannot account for the change in overall borrowing, the share of 
new loans used for loan consolidation rose from around 6% to more than 12%. Source: NOP Financial Research Survey. 
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typically cheaper than unsecured debt, it will tend to be used in preference to unsecured debt 
by individuals with access to both types of debt. This points to the importance in the empirical 
analysis of taking into account the circumstances of the individual borrower, including their 
position in the housing market. 
Our empirical analysis builds on previous household-level studies, mainly concerned 
with US households. For instance, Cox and Jappelli (1993) use the 1983 Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) to estimate a cross-sectional demand for debt equation for US households. 
They find a positive relationship with permanent income and net worth and a negative 
relationship with current income and age. Duca and Rosenthal (1993) also use the 1983 SCF 
and find that the demand for debt of young households is positively related to wealth, income 
and household size and negatively related to unemployment. Crook (2001) focuses on a more 
recent period and finds that US households’ demand for debt is related positively to home 
ownership, family size, and job status, while negatively related to net worth, age and risk 
aversion. 
For British households, Bridges and Disney (2002) find that the access to unsecured 
debt of low-income households is positively associated with income-related and income 
generating characteristics. Banks et al. (2002) describe the distribution of British household 
debt according to the BHPS as a part of a very comprehensive analysis of the distribution 
of financial wealth in the UK in 2000. Cox et al. (2002) also use the BHPS to analyse the 
changes in the distribution of household debt-income ratios, income and assets across 
borrowers and conclude that the increase in debt-income ratios of British households 
during the second half of the 1990s was larger among the youngest and lowest-income 
households2.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 extends a standard life-cycle model 
of consumption to take account of the relationship between secured and unsecured 
borrowing. Section 3 outlines the empirical method used. Section 4 describes unsecured 
debt in the BHPS and examines the determinants of debt in a cross-sectional approach. 
Section 5 focuses on debt changes using the panel dimension in the BHPS. Section 6 
concludes. 
                                                                          
2. We investigate the impact of unsecured debt on financial distress among British households in a separate 
paper [Del-Río and Young (2005)]. 
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2 The theoretical determinants of unsecured debt 
One of the most important characteristics of unsecured debt is that it is usually expensive 
relative to other possible methods of finance, such as secured borrowing or running down 
asset holdings. This suggests that its use might be concentrated among those who do not 
have access to cheaper finance. In this section, we outline a calibrated version of the 
life-cycle model of consumption, where households are able to borrow at relatively low rates 
against the security of their house, but have to pay higher rates for unsecured borrowing3. In 
contrast to other models, there are no quantitative credit constraints in the unsecured market 
in this model, instead households are limited in the amount they can borrow at lower secured 
interest rates. This model captures many of the key characteristics of the UK debt market, in 
that a borrower’s financial decisions appear to be strongly tied to their position in the housing 
market. The model provides a framework for understanding the effect of factors which vary 
across households, thereby helping to explain cross-sectional differences in indebtedness, 
and factors which change over time. 
Households are assumed to be economically active for three periods, reflecting 
different phases of the life cycle. During this time they earn an exogenous income stream and 
consume non-durable goods and housing. They aim to maximise intertemporal utility and to 
die solvent. Their intertemporal utility function at the beginning of their lives is given by: 
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where h and c represent their ownership of housing and consumption of goods respectively, 
α is a parameter indicating their preference for housing relative to goods, γ is the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion and δ indicates their rate of time preference. 
Households face the following flow budget constraint: 
st + ut = ptct + qtht + (1+rt-1)st-1 + (1 + rt-1 + ηt-1)ut-1 - qtht-1 - yt,    t=1,2,3,4. (2.2) 
where s and u are stocks of secured and unsecured debt respectively, y is exogenous 
nominal non-property income, pt and qt are the prices of goods and housing respectively, r is 
the rate of interest on secured debt and η is the premium on unsecured borrowing. It is 
assumed that all households aim to die with zero net worth, so that at the beginning of the 
period after their death (at date 4) the proceeds from the sale of the house is sufficient to pay 
off all remaining debt. 
Households can use secured and unsecured debt to smooth their spending over 
time. The use of secured and unsecured debt is assumed to be constrained such that: 
st ≤ φt qt ht (2.3) 
0 ≤ ut (2.4) 
The first expression states that secured debt cannot exceed a proportion, φ, of the 
value of the household’s house qh. The second expression states that unsecured debt 
cannot be negative (so households cannot lend at high unsecured interest rates). 
The choice of how much secured and unsecured debt to borrow is then 
determined jointly with that of how much to consume and how much to spend on housing. 
                                                                          
3. No distinction is made at this stage between a household and the individuals within it. Our empirical analysis 
considers the borrowing decisions of individuals rather than households. 
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Optimal housing and non-housing consumption are derived by maximising (2.1) subject 
to (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4). There are three possible solutions at any date, depending on 
which of the borrowing constraints are binding. These are reflected in the first order 
conditions for intertemporal consumption over time (2.5) and the choice between housing and 
goods (2.6), written for the case when the secured debt constraint is binding: 
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In this case, both inter-temporal and intra-temporal consumption decisions are 
affected by the rate of interest on unsecured borrowing. When the secured debt constraint is 
not binding, the premium on unsecured debt drops out of these conditions. This has the 
effect of raising current relative to future consumption and changing the effective relative price 
of housing. The third possible outcome is a corner solution where household borrowing 
violates the secured borrowing constraint if consumption choices can be made at secured 
borrowing rates, but is within the constraint when choices are made at higher unsecured 
rates. 
Depending on the exact specification of preferences, the model can be solved for 
the optimal time profile of consumption of housing and goods that satisfy the budget 
constraint and the terminal condition. Iterative methods need to be used, because 
behaviour at any date depends on whether secured borrowing constraints are expected to 
be binding in the future. The steady-state solution is illustrated here by means of a model 
calibrated roughly to the UK situation. The three periods of the model can be thought of as 
representing 15 years each. 
The results are shown in Table A for different scenarios and for two different levels 
of the premium on unsecured borrowing. In the main case, income in the (15-year) first 
period is £300,000, consistent with annual income of £20,000. This rises to the equivalent 
of £40,000 per annum in the second stage of life, before falling back to £15,000 per annum in 
the last stage of life (which includes retirement). The rate of time preference has been set 
equal to the rate of interest on secured debt (0.3, equivalent to 2% per annum) so that in the 
absence of constraints individuals would smooth consumption over their life-cycle by 
borrowing when young, saving when in middle age and running down their assets in old age 
and at death. But the imposition of a limit on secured borrowing of up to 90% of the value of 
owned housing prevents individuals from reaching this optimum. 
In the case where the premium on unsecured debt is 0.1, consumption of goods 
in the first period is virtually equal to income and the stock of housing is £54,400, just 
over 2.5 times annual income. This is financed by secured debt of £48,900, the maximum 
possible given the secured borrowing constraint. Unsecured borrowing in the first period is 
relatively small at £500. After the first period, the borrowing constraint in the model no longer 
binds, so that individuals choose the same level of consumption in the second and third 
stages of life.  The pattern of income over time means that individuals build up financial assets 
during the second stage of life and run these down in the third stage, so that when they die 
the value of their house is sufficient to pay off their secured debt. Only in the first period of life 
is any unsecured debt borrowed. 
In the same circumstances, but where the premium on unsecured debt is lower 
at 0.05, individuals are better able to smooth consumption over time. Consumption is still 
lower in the first stage of life and higher thereafter because of the limitation on secured 
borrowing, but it is higher in the first period than it would have been with a higher unsecured 
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borrowing premium. This is financed both by higher secured and unsecured borrowing; 
secured borrowing is higher since individuals choose to buy a larger stock of housing, with 
the additional amount of consumer spending effectively financed by unsecured borrowing, 
which eases the secured borrowing constraint somewhat. Note that despite the lower rate of 
interest on unsecured borrowing, those in the second and third stage of life do not use it 
either because they do not need to borrow or because cheaper secured borrowing is 
available. 
 
 
 
The second case we consider is of a higher secured borrowing limit of 95% of the 
value of the individual’s house, rather than 90% as in the base case. The main effect is in 
causing individuals to substitute secured debt for unsecured debt with little or no noticeable 
effect on first period spending in either case. The reason for this negligible impact is that the 
change in the borrowing limit does little to alleviate the constraint. In the absence of any 
restriction on secured borrowing, individuals in the same circumstances would choose to 
invest £80,000 in housing and borrow £140,000, a loan to value ratio of 175%, using the 
additional resources to finance consumption of goods. Hence, the relaxation of the constraint 
does little to move individuals to their optimum position. 
The third case shows the behaviour of those who are not owner-occupiers because 
they have no taste for home ownership (other than to a trivial extent). Consumption 
smoothing is prevented by the higher effective rate of interest on borrowing, which results in 
less consumption than optimal being chosen in the first stage of life. This is clearly less of a 
problem when the premium on unsecured borrowing is lower. In the cross-section, in 
comparison with those who have a stronger preference for housing, unsecured borrowing is 
higher for those who do not have access to the secured debt market, reflecting a higher level 
 
Table A:  Comparative statistics of calibrated model
£,thousands
Period c h s u y c H s u y
Main case:
1 295.1 54.4 48.9 0.5 300 325.8 66.1 59.5 32.4 300
2 409.8 93.5 -86.8 0 600 385.6 87.9 -71.5 0 600
3 409.8 93.5 71.9 0 225 385.6 87.9 67.6 0 225
Higher secured borrowing limit ( φ  = 0.95)
1 297.3 54.8 52 0 300 325.8 66.1 62.8 29.2 300
2 408.2 93.1 -85.8 0 600 385.6 87.9 -71.5 0 600
3 408.2 93.1 71.6 0 225 385.6 87.9 67.6 0 225
Low ownership of housing (α=0.0005)
1 315.4 0.55 0.5 15.5 300 345.5 0.66 0.6 45.6 300
2 424.4 0.92 -152.9 0 600 401.9 0.87 -135.6 0 600
3 424.4 0.92 0.7 0 225 401.9 0.87 0.67 0 225
Low income expectations
1 267.1 60.9 28.1 0 300
2 267.1 60.9 3.6 0 300
3 267.1 60.9 46.9 0 225
Less patience ( δ=0.4)
1 376.9 69.4 62.5 83.8 300 410.8 83.4 75.1 119.1 300
2 389.2 88.8 7.1 0 600 361.4 82.4 18.9 0 600
3 289.3 66 50.8 0 225 268.7 61.3 47.1 0 225
Main case: δ  = 0.3, α  = 0.05, γ =0.25, φ  = 0.90.
Unsecured premium = 0.1 Unsecured premium = 0.05
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of non-housing consumption, although their overall level of borrowing is lower since they do 
not have to finance the purchase of a house. Their net worth is also lower since they have no 
housing wealth. 
The fourth case illustrates the importance of income expectations on borrowing. With 
second stage income expected to be the same as in the first stage of life, it is possible for the 
individual to smooth consumption without recourse to unsecured debt. Note that the stock of 
housing purchased in the first stage of life is higher than for those who have higher lifetime 
incomes but are constrained from borrowing as much as they would like, indicating the effect 
of the borrowing constraint on the intratemporal consumption decision. 
The fifth case shows the effect of less patience. In the high-unsecured premium 
case, this leads to a hump-shaped path of consumption, with the premium on borrowing 
causing impatient individuals to restrain their desire for present consumption. Despite this, 
their unsecured borrowing exceeds their secured borrowing. In the low unsecured premium 
case, there is no hump shape in consumption as individuals are more able to achieve their 
preferred consumption path. 
The implications of the model are that unsecured debt is likely to be used more by 
those who are young, impatient, with strong income expectations and no access to cheaper 
secured debt. It is likely to be used most when unsecured borrowing costs least. The model 
shows that there are situations where unsecured and secured debt tend to move in opposite 
directions in response to shocks, when the constraint on secured borrowing is relaxed for 
example, and when they move together, as when unsecured borrowing rates are reduced. 
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3 Estimating the empirical determinants of unsecured debt 
The previous discussion is intended to provide a framework for understanding the 
determinants of unsecured debt rather than a model to be estimated. It suggests that 
unsecured borrowing is likely to be related to the household’s position in the life-cycle, rate of 
time preference, access to cheaper secured finance, income and income expectations and 
the cost of unsecured borrowing. In this section, we describe how the determinants of the 
demand for unsecured debt may be estimated empirically. Suppose that the demand function 
for unsecured debt by individual i at date t, Dit, is of the following general form: 
it
u
ittittittiit rcZbYfaD ε+−++= )(  (3.1) 
where ai is an individual-specific fixed effect, Y represents the income and other economic 
circumstances of the individual, the function f(.) denotes that the (time-varying) relationship 
between D and Y could be non-linear, Z incorporates the individual’s demographic and other 
personal characteristics, including age-related effects, ru the individual-specific interest rate 
levied on unsecured debt and ε the unobserved determinants of unsecured debt. The 
coefficients, other than the fixed effect, ai, can potentially vary over time. 
Supply conditions in the unsecured credit market are reflected in the effective rate of 
interest charged on unsecured debt. Where individuals are credit-constrained, the effective 
rate can be thought of as being high enough to equate their demand for unsecured loans to 
the supply. For example, the effective interest rate might be given by: 
)( itttt
u
it Ygrr −+= ϕ  (3.2) 
where r is the base rate, ϕt is the premium that financial institutions charge to the riskiest 
individuals and the negative (possibly non-linear) relationship between the effective rate and 
individual income reflects lower perceived lending risks at high levels of individual income. 
Substituting (3.2) into (3.1) then gives a reduced form debt function: 
ittttittitttittiit rcZbYgcYfaD εϕ ++−+++= )())()((  (3.3) 
This expression helps to clarify a number of points relevant to how it is estimated. 
First, in cross-sections, it is impossible to estimate the individual specific fixed effects, αi, 
and the intercept term has to be imposed at the same value across all individuals. This means 
that any genuine fixed effects become part of the error term. If these are correlated with any 
of the explanatory variables, the relevant coefficients will be biased. So if individuals with a 
particularly high rate of time preference also choose to work more and so earn higher 
incomes, the estimated coefficient on income will overstate the response of unsecured 
borrowing to a change in income. Second, also in cross-sections, there is no variation across 
individuals in macroeconomic variables such as the base rate of interest, r, so their impact 
becomes part of the overall intercept term. Third, we allow the relationship between 
unsecured debt and income to be non-linear. In cross-section estimation below we do this by 
estimating separate intercept coefficients according to the individual’s position in the income 
distribution. We use a similar approach to estimate age effects. Fourth, with panel data with a 
sufficiently long time dimension, it is possible to avoid the biases due to individual-specific 
fixed effects and to identify the impact of macroeconomic factors, but it is also necessary 
to assume that coefficients are either constant over time, or have a relatively simple structure. 
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In fact, most of our estimation effort is in estimating cross-section regressions for 1995 
and 2000, but we do make some use of the limited panel information available as a check 
that the cross-section results are not strongly affected by correlation between individual fixed 
effects and explanatory variables. 
A further econometric issue is how to deal with the fact that most people in our 
sample do not participate in the unsecured debt market. This could arise, as in the theoretical 
model, because they do not want any unsecured debt at prevailing interest rates; it could also 
reflect quantitative credit constraints or high entry costs that prevent them reaching their 
desired debt position. These two possibilities present different econometric problems [see 
Wooldridge (2002)]. In the former case, the econometric issue is that many observations are 
at a corner solution, in this case with no unsecured debt, and simply estimating the 
parameters in (3.3) over all households, including those without debt, using say a Tobit 
approach would be highly influenced by participation decisions. In the latter case, the 
econometric issue arises because of possible non-random sample selection that prevents 
some individuals participating in the market. In principle, such biases can be avoided by 
following the approach of Heckman (1979), which involves estimating a model of credit 
market participation, where this is conditioned on factors additional to those that determine 
the amount of debt borrowed. Studies similar to ours, such as Duca and Rosenthal (1993), 
Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Crook (2001), use a two-step Heckman procedure that involves 
including two additional terms in the debt equation to capture, firstly, the probability of an 
individual participating in the credit market, and secondly, their not being credit constrained. 
In the first step, probit models are used to estimate the probability of participating in the 
market and the probability of being unconstrained4. Then, the estimated effects are included 
as additional regressors in (3.3), so that the parameters can be interpreted as those of a true 
demand function. 
We do not follow this approach for two reasons. First, unlike the US surveys, 
the BHPS does not provide any direct measure that would make it possible to 
discriminate between constrained and unconstrained individuals, although it is unlikely 
that many individuals in the UK are unable to borrow at all5. Second, the implementation of 
the Heckman procedure is quite problematic without a strong theoretical case for 
supplementary variablesthat affect the participation decision but do not influence the 
amount borrowed6. Partly for this reason, our results from using a Heckman approach are no 
different to those from simple OLS cross-section regressions7. This also suggests that any 
corner-solution biases are small. Given this and the results in previous studies we will focus 
separately on the participation equation (using a probit model) and on debt equations, using 
simple OLS cross-section regressions for those with debt, excluding non-participants. 
 
                                                                          
4. According to Jappelli (1990), credit constraints affect 19% of households and as many as 30% of  young households 
[Duca and Rosenthal (1993)]. Other related works are, Zeldes (1989), Cox and Jappelli (1993), Crook (1996), Gross and 
Souleles (2002). For the United Kingdom, Davies and Weber (1991), using household-level data and identifying 
unconstrained households as those with savings, found evidence of declining liquidity constraints but not of loosening 
credit contraints in the 1980s. Bayoumi (1993) found that softer liquidity constraints due to financial deregulation during 
the 1980s had a significant effect on UK consumption. More recently, Fernández-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2002) 
estimated an index of non-price credit conditions, and found evidence of looser credit restrictions during the 1980s and 
second half of the 1990s. 
5. One possible proxy is given in wave 5, when individuals state whether they think that it was a right time to use credit in 
the hypothetical case that they wanted to buy something big. One of the possible answers to this question was ‘Can’t 
get credit’ and that was only selected by 2.4% of 8,774 respondents. 
6. Cox and Jappelli (1993) used years of education, occupation, area income, employment status, and rural/urban 
status as supplementary variables for the probability of having positive debt. Duca and Rosenthal (1993) and 
Crook (1996), by contrast, assumed that the same variables determined the probability of having debt and the amount 
borrowed (allowing for different parameters in the participation and debt equations). 
7. Results using the Heckman procedure are available upon request. When conducting the two-step Heckman 
procedure, we have added dummies for region, race and employment status to the participation equation, as factors 
that might influence participation in the unsecured debt market without having much effect on the overall amount 
borrowed. 
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4 A cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of unsecured debt 
4.1 The data 
The BHPS8 is an annual national survey of the economic and demographic characteristics of 
British individuals and households. The first wave covered a representative sample of the 
population of Great Britain in 1991. This sample has remained broadly representative9 given 
that the same individuals are re-interviewed each year and, if they split-off from original 
households, all adult members of their new households are also interviewed. In 1991 the 
survey included around 5,500 households and 10,300 individuals (aged over 16 years). 
Information on unsecured debt and financial assets is available only in waves 5 
and 10 of the BHPS covering 1995 and 2000. For unsecured debt, individuals are asked 
about the overall amount they owe, excluding credit card and other bills being paid off in the 
month of the interview10. They are shown a card to prompt them about the forms in which 
they may have borrowed. In 1995, the prompt card contained the following list of debt 
instruments: hire purchase agreements, personal loans (from bank, building society or other 
financial institution), credit cards, catalogue or mail order purchase agreements, DSS Social 
Fund loan, any other loan from a private individual, or anything else. In 2000, two additional 
instruments, overdrafts and student loans, were added to this list. 
This change in the list of unsecured debt instruments affects any analysis attempting 
to compare responses across the two waves of the survey. As both types of instrument were 
available in 1995, it is not clear how respondents with overdrafts or student loans would 
have included this type of borrowing in their answers to the survey at that time without 
being prompted. For example, they could have considered borrowing on overdrafts as a 
form of personal loan. But the change in question must leave room for doubt that this was 
the case. As shown in Table B, overdrafts represented nearly 7% of the total number of 
debt instruments mentioned in 2000. Student loans were a less significant 1% of total debt 
instruments. If borrowing using these instruments were entirely omitted in 1995, but not 2000, 
then a comparison would overstate the increase in unsecured household debt. There is some 
evidence against this in that Redwood and Tudela (2004) find that unsecured debt is more 
underreported relative to aggregate figures in 2000 than in 1995. This might suggest that the 
new listed instruments in 2000 were included in other categories in 1995. Throughout this 
analysis we assess the sensitivity of estimates to this potential problem by changing the 
sample in 2000. 
                                                                          
8. The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is managed by the ESRC UK Longitudinal Studies Centre with the 
Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex. Detailed information can be found in Brice et 
al. (2002), available at http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/. 
9. The sample excludes households located north of the Caledonian Canal in Scotland. Since 1997, new samples have 
been added to the BHPS aimed at extending the coverage of some particular regions and groups of population. We 
exclude them to keep the sample representative of the British population as a whole. 
10. If individuals do not know the exact amount they owe, they are asked to indicate whether it is more than £100, more 
than £500, more than £1,500, or more than £5,000. Depending on the case we assign a debt of £50, £300, £1,000, 
£3,250 or £7,000. This affects 310 borrowers (out of 6,889). If individuals report that the debt is a joint commitment we 
assign half of the value. In 2000 we can discover which part of the debt is a sole commitment but we do not use 
this information since it is not available for 1995. Joint commitments affect 984 and 709 individuals out of 3,481 
and 3,458 debtors in 1995 and 2000 respectively. For each year, all unsecured debt values above the 99th percentile are 
recorded to the value of the 99th percentile. This is also done for unsecured debt-income ratios. 
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A likely reason for the addition of the student loan category in the 2000 
survey is that loans had by then become the main form of financial support for 
students. Up to and including academic year 1997/98 students were funded under a different 
set of arrangements, introduced in 1990/91, when non income-assessed student loans were 
introduced to provide extra resources towards living expenses and partially to replace grants. 
The main grant rates were frozen at their 1990/91 values until 1994/95 when the shift from 
grant to loan was accelerated by reducing the level of grant rates and increasing loan rates. 
Further details on the extent of student loan finance are provided by Callender and 
Wilkinson (2003). This shift in the student finance regime towards loans is also likely to distort 
unsecured debt market participation and borrowing, especially among individuals and their 
families who have been students during the new regime. Again, we try to avoid the distortion 
by varying the sample to exclude those affected. 
4.2 Preliminary data description 
Table C shows that the proportion of individuals reporting that they had any unsecured debt 
did not change between 1995 and 2000, with around 39% of individuals who answered 
this question claiming to have at least one form of unsecured debt in both years11. 
Significantly, among those with some unsecured debt, the mean amount almost 
doubled from £1,489 in 1995 to £2,793 in 2000. Indeed, unsecured debt approximately 
                                                                          
11. About 5% of individuals did not answer this question in both 1995 and 2000. 
Table B: Number of unsecured debt instruments by age group
age
hire 
purchase
personal 
loan
credit 
cards
mail order 
purchase
DSS 
Social 
Fund loan
loans from 
individuals
something 
else overdraft
student 
loan Total Total (%)
16-20 18 74 30 74 11 15 5 - - 227 4.7%
20-25 110 258 144 136 19 33 8 - - 708 14.7%
25-30 146 239 189 149 17 28 7 - - 775 16.1%
30-35 192 210 215 179 12 24 3 - - 835 17.3%
35-40 130 166 157 128 7 14 7 - - 609 12.6%
40-45 115 138 150 89 10 6 5 - - 513 10.6%
45-50 101 120 139 95 2 9 6 - - 472 9.8%
50-55 59 73 104 63 3 5 4 - - 311 6.5%
55-60 49 31 48 25 1 1 - - 155 3.2%
60+ 58 26 76 47 1 3 4 - - 215 4.5%
Total 978 1335 1252 985 83 138 49 4820 100%
Total (%) 20.3% 27.7% 26.0% 20.4% 1.7% 2.9% 1.0% 100
age
hire 
purchase
personal 
loan
credit 
cards
mail order 
purchase
DSS 
Social 
Fund loan
loans from 
individuals
something 
else overdraft
student 
loan Total Total (%)
16-20 13 44 51 51 10 11 56 94 6 336 5.8%
20-25 65 175 170 87 15 28 152 173 11 876 15.1%
25-30 142 233 238 114 20 25 113 77 9 971 16.7%
30-35 136 239 257 134 15 17 106 28 3 935 16.1%
35-40 136 212 278 125 14 19 76 12 6 878 15.1%
40-45 91 157 170 86 8 4 63 3 6 588 10.1%
45-50 72 110 124 55 3 4 33 3 8 412 7.1%
50-55 57 85 121 58 2 3 29 2 8 365 6.3%
55-60 28 61 69 44 3 17 1 3 226 3.9%
60+ 46 39 76 53 11 6 231 4.0%
Total 786 1355 1554 807 90 111 656 393 66 5818 100%
Total (%) 13.5% 23.3% 26.7% 13.9% 1.5% 1.9% 11.3% 6.8% 1.1% 100
1995
2000
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doubled at most points of the distribution with the median rising from £700 per debtor 
in 1995 to £1,500 in 2000 and the 90th percentile rising from £4,000 to £8,000. The ratio of 
unsecured debt to income also rose at most points of the distribution. For individuals 
with some debt, the median of the ratio increased from 8% in 1995 to 12% in 2000 while 
the 90th percentile rose from around 42% in 1995 to 70% in 2000, although the increase is 
more modest when we exclude full-time students from the sample12.  
 
 
 
As suggested by the life-cycle model and the simple model of Section 2, there 
are clear differences in unsecured debt market participation by age. Table D shows 
that in both 1995 and 2000, around 60% of individuals aged 20 to 35 years old had at 
least one form of unsecured debt. This fraction decreases with age to 10% for individuals 
older than 60. There is also a clear increasing relationship between unsecured debt market 
participation and income which is similar in both 1995 and 200013. 
                                                                          
12. Note that individuals provide the total amount of debt they owe and the different classes of instruments they use. 
There is no information on debt by instrument. Therefore, in the third column of Table C, when excluding households 
with overdrafts we are also excluding the debt that these borrowers may hold in other instruments. Since individuals with 
overdrafts are usually high debtors these figures might be biasing downward the true figure. 
13. Income groups are deciles of the income distribution of the total sample in 1995. In 2000 decile values are updated 
with the Retail Price Index. 
1995 2000 2000 (a) 1995 2000 (a)
Individuals with no debt 5,353 5,182 5,182 4,899 4,890
Individuals with debt 3,431 3,458 3,004 3,276 3,275
Proportation of debtors 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.40
Debt (Levels £)
sample size 3,265 3,227 2,827 3,133 3,089
mean 1,489 2,973 2,708 1,492 2,936
10th percentile 60 100 100 60 100
30th percentile 250 500 500 250 500
50th percentile 700 1500 1500 700 1500
70th percentile 1,600 3,500 3,000 1625 3,500
90th percentile 4,000 8,000 7,500 4,000 8,000
Debt-income ratio (%) (b)
sample size 3265 3257 2827 3133 3089
mean 21 39 24 18 31
10th percentile 1 1 1 1 1
30th percentile 3 5 4 3 5
50th percentile 8 12 10 7 11
70th percentile 17 26 22 16 24
90th percentile 42 70 54 39 61
(b) Excluding individuals with income below 100
(a) The number of households with unsecured debt excludes families whose debt is only in the form of 
student loans or overdrafts. Debt and debt-income ratios are calculated excluding households with 
overdrafts or student loans, no matter if they have other type of instruments.
Excluding full time 
students
Table C: Individual debt levels and debt-income ratios of debt-holders
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There is no significant change in the overall participation rate between 1995 
and 2000. Within individual age groups, there is an increase in participation among those 
who are under 30 that is particularly marked for 16 to 20 year olds. Much of this is likely 
to reflect the shift in student finance between 1995 and 2000 as there is no change in 
participation for 16 to 25 year olds once full-time students are excluded (fourth and fifth 
columns of Table D). Similarly, the apparent increase in participation among the lowest 
income group appears to be due to greater participation by full-time students. Once they are 
excluded, there is no change in participation in the lowest income group. 
In contrast to participation, there is no clear evidence of any systematic effect of age 
on the amount borrowed (see top panels of Chart 1 and Chart 1b), apart from for the oldest 
and youngest groups who tend to borrow less. The amount borrowed tends to rise in line 
with the level of income, with the unsecured debt to income ratio being fairly similar across all 
but the lowest income groups, who have by far the highest levels of unsecured debt in 
relation to income14.  
                                                                          
14. In Cox et al. (2002) the unsecured debt-income ratio seems to be negatively correlated with age and income. 
Discrepancies can arise since their study focuses on households, not on individuals, and income variables and groups 
can differ. In addition our analysis excludes all new samples in the BHPS since 1997. 
Table D: Proportion of borrowers and sample weights by age and income.
% Total sample
1995 2000 2000 (a) 1995 2000 1995 2000
age groups
16-20 24 33 26 34 34 9 8
20-25 58 60 57 59 59 9 9
25-30 58 62 61 58 62 10 10
30-35 57 57 56 57 57 11 10
35-40 54 55 54 54 55 9 10
40-45 48 49 49 49 49 8 9
45-50 43 41 41 43 41 9 8
50-55 40 33 33 40 33 7 9
55-60 28 31 31 28 31 6 6
60+ 10 11 11 10 11 21 21
Total 39 40 39 39 40 100 100
income groups (by deciles)
1 24 30 25 30 31 10 9
2 29 29 27 29 27 10 8
3 29 30 28 28 28 10 7
4 32 29 29 31 29 10 8
5 36 31 30 36 30 10 10
6 40 39 39 39 39 10 11
7 48 44 43 48 44 10 11
8 49 49 49 49 49 10 11
9 55 55 55 55 55 10 12
10 50 50 49 50 50 10 12
Total 39 40 39 39 40 100 100
Excluding ft 
students
Proportion of borrowers Sample weights of 
each age and income 
group
(a) Households with overdrafts or student loans and with no other type of unsecured debt 
are excluded
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Debt levels and debt-income ratios are significantly higher for all groups in 2000 
than in 1995. The increase seems to be more important for the lowest income decile and 
those between 20 and 25, although this appears to be affected by the change in BHPS 
questionnaire and methods of student finance. When those with only overdrafts or student 
loans are excluded the increase in debt levels is much more modest for these groups 
(see dashed lines in Chart 1)15. However, excluding these groups may leave out people with 
high debt levels for other reasons. Some evidence in favour of this view is that when full-time 
students are excluded (Chart 1b), there remains a large increase in debt for those with low 
incomes and those between 20 and 25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
15. The increase in debt for all deciles is statistically significant. 
Chart 1: Unsecured debt levels and debt-income ratios  by age and income
All figures are calcultated excluding individuals with income below 100 pounds
(a) Excluding households with overdrafts or student loans
 Mean unsecured debt of debtors 
(constant prices 1995)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
16-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 60+
age
£
1995
2000
2000 (a)
Unsecured debt-income ratio (Median) 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
16-20 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-40 40-45 45-50 50-55 55-60 60+
age
1995
2000
2000 (a)
Unsecured debt-income ratio (Median) 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
income deciles
1995
2000
2000 (a)
(0.61)
(*) 0.60
 Mean unsecured debt of debtors 
(constant prices 1995)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
income deciles
£
1995
2000
2000 (a)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 24 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0511 
 
 
 
Table E and Chart 2 show the relationship between unsecured debt and various 
measures of housing wealth and therefore secured debt capacity. There is a clear 
negative relationship between participation in the unsecured debt market and net housing 
wealth16, but the relationship between the amount borrowed and net housing wealth is less 
clear (see Chart 2). In 1995, the unsecured debt-income ratio appears to be independent of 
net housing wealth. The former increased most between 1995 and 2000 for those with low 
housing wealth, such that there is a slight decreasing relationship in 2000. 
 
                                                                          
16. Net housing wealth is the value of the residential house net of mortgages. Since these are household variables 
in BHPS we assign half the value of the house and mortgage to the first and second person owning the 
accommodation. 
Chart 1b: Unsecured debt levels and debt-income ratios  by age and income 
Sample excluding full time students
All figures are calcultated excluding individuals with income below 100 pounds
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Table E: Proportion of borrowers and sample weights by age and income.
% Total sample
1995 2000 2000 (a) 1995 2000
Net housing wealth
no housing wealth 37 41 38 38 39
< percentile10 67 66 66 66 67
 10 - 30 55 55 55 55 54
30-50 39 39 39 39 39
50-70 32 32 31 31 31
70-90 26 24 23 23 25
more than 90 21 21 21 21 21
Total 38 39 38 38 39
Housing status
Other 40 43 41 41 40
Owner occupier,   no mortgage 16 16 15 15 16
Living with owner-occupiers 23 29 26 26 25
Owner occupier with mortgage 53 53 52 52 53
Living with mortgagers 34 40 37 37 42
Total 39 40 39 39 40
Mortgage-debtors
< percentile 20 42 41 41 41 43
20-40 51 54 53 53 52
40-60 60 60 60 60 60
60-80 60 59 58 58 60
more than 80 53 56 56 56 53
Total 53 54 54 54 53
Financial wealth
no financial wealth 41 41 39 39 42
quartile 1 51 55 54 54 55
quartile 2 45 50 48 48 48
quartile 3 34 38 36 36 35
quartile 4 25 26 25 25 25
Total 40 42 41 41 41
Excluding ft 
students
Proportion of borrowers
(a) Households with overdrafts or student loans and with no other type of unsecured 
debt are excluded
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0511 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Unsecured debt levels and debt-income ratios  by housing-wealth and secured debt
All figures are calcultated excluding individuals with income below 100 pounds
(a) Excluding households with overdrafts or student loans
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Turning to housing status, owner-occupiers with a mortgage have a higher 
propensity to hold unsecured debt than other groups in both 1995 and 2000. They also 
have higher amounts of unsecured debt than owners with no secured debt. Further, among 
households with mortgages, there seems to be a weak positive correlation between the 
level of unsecured debt and the secured debt-income ratio in 2000 and a stronger positive 
relationship between the unsecured debt-income ratio and the secured debt-income ratio 
in 2000. These general relationships are broadly consistent with the theoretical model of 
Section 2, although it is not clear why those with relatively low secured debt-income ratios 
choose to have any unsecured debt rather than seeking to increase their lower-cost secured 
debt17.  
As regards financial wealth18, there seems to be a negative relationship between 
the size of financial assets and participation in the unsecured debt market (see Table E and 
Chart 3)19. In 2000, there is a relatively clear decreasing relationship between unsecured 
debt-income ratios and financial wealth20. Those with a low level of financial assets are more 
likely to hold unsecured debt to finance consumption. 
All these figures point to a quite generalised increase in the average unsecured debt 
of borrowers between 1995 and 2000, while participation rates were broadly unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
17. The increase in the unsecured debt of those with relatively high mortgage debt-income ratios could be related to a 
change in the mortgage market in 1998. From that time, borrowers with a secured loan to housing value ratio of less 
than 0.9 were exempted from paying for mortgage indemnity insurance. This might have caused some borrowers to 
substitute unsecured for secured borrowing. Fernández-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2002) estimate that this raised the 
long-run stock of aggregate unsecured credit by 8%. 
18. This variable does not include assets in the form of pension funds or insurance products. 
19. Financial wealth groups are percentiles for those with positive financial assets. We consider separately those with no 
financial wealth. We assign equal shares if savings are held jointly. 
20. The same pattern is observed when considering only liquid financial assets. 
Chart 3: Unsecured debt levels and debt-income ratios  by financial wealth
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4.3 Estimation results 
While the preceding section provides a broad overview of unsecured debt and its correlation 
with the characteristics and circumstances of individual borrowers, a major limitation of purely 
descriptive analysis is the inability to disentangle the independent contributions of individual 
factors. In this sub-section, we use regression analysis to assess statistically the key factors 
determining participation and the amount borrowed in the unsecured debt market. 
It is not clear whether decisions about unsecured borrowing are taken at the level of 
the individual borrower or the household. Certainly it is possible to think of some households 
where all decisions are collective and others where the individual members of the household 
appear to lead independent lives. Here, we suppose that the demand for unsecured debt is 
an individual decision although household circumstances matter. In order to take household 
characteristics into account we include as explanatory variables marital status, gender, 
number of dependent children, the income of the rest of the members of the household, 
whether the individual is head of household and the type of housing tenure. 
The other explanatory variables in the debt and participation equations include age 
dummies to take into account the life-cycle stage of individuals and variables aimed at 
explaining the effect of current and expected income on consumption and borrowing. These 
variables are actual income, educational qualifications to proxy human capital21 and whether 
the individual expects an improvement in his financial situation. Employment status is included 
to proxy income uncertainty. Some of the income-related variables could also have an 
additional effect in the reduced form equation through their impact on the unsecured debt 
premium if they are correlated with the risk of default. We also include dummies to take into 
account whether individuals have access to the mortgage market and, in the case of 
mortgagors, distinguish them by the level of the mortgage debt-income ratio. Gross financial 
wealth is included in the form of a dummy variable distinguishing between those with no 
financial wealth and those with financial wealth below and above the median. Finally, we add 
region dummies. Other idiosyncratic differences in household preferences and interest rates 
will be reflected in the error term, because, as noted earlier, with cross-section data we 
cannot separate the random and systematic component of the residuals. 
The results are presented in Table F, for the probit model of unsecured debt market 
participation, and Table G for the equation for the unsecured debt holdings of those who 
participate. We report only OLS results for the latter equation, although we also estimated it 
using a two-step Heckman procedure which attempts to control for sample selection bias by 
including the estimated probability of participation (in the form of the inverse of Mill’s ratio) as 
an additional regressor. This variable is only significant in 2000 when it is negative, suggesting 
that the unobservable characteristics that induce people to participate in the unsecured debt 
market are negatively correlated with the unobservable factors determining how much 
they borrow having entered the market. One possible explanation for this effect is that the 
unobservable (to the researcher) characteristics of those who are the most eligible borrowers 
from the perspective of lenders also reduce the amount that these individuals wish to borrow. 
This is the opposite of the effect that would be obtained if market participation decisions were 
affected by the presence of entry costs as in Crook (2001). However, it is not clear why this 
factor should be stronger in 2000 than 199522. As the other coefficients are not affected by 
the inclusion of this term we focus on the OLS results. 
                                                                          
21. We consider three groups. The first one corresponds to individuals with the highest educational qualification 
including a higher degree, first degree, teaching and other higher qualifications. The second group includes those with 
nursing, GCE A Levels, GCE O Levels or equivalent, commercial qualifications and apprenticeships. The third group 
comprises those without qualifications. 
22. An alternative possible interpretation is related to the presence of costs when withdrawing equity from the value of 
housing. These costs may induce individuals with a higher demand for funds to borrow in the secured debt market while 
only those with a lower demand for funds would borrow in the unsecured debt market, even though they have to pay a 
premium. This effect would be stronger in the more buoyant housing market conditions of 2000. 
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For the purposes of comparing parameters between 1995 and 2000 we include all 
variables interacted with a dummy for the year 2000 (instead of carrying out two separate 
estimations). In addition, because of concerns about changes in the survey questions and 
nature of student finance between 1995 and 2000, we present separate results for the whole 
sample (Model 1) and for over-35 year olds only (Model 2). This is to generate exogenously a 
sample that contains almost nobody with either student loans or overdrafts in 2000. We also 
used other methods to ensure comparability between the 1995 and 2000 samples, although 
these are not reported in full23.  
Since most of the explanatory variables take the form of dummy rather than 
continuous variables, the estimation is relative to a ‘reference group’ for whom only the 
constant term is evaluated. The reference group is indicated clearly in the table24. According 
to the estimated probit model, the probability of having unsecured debt for the reference 
group was 0.53 in 2000 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this probability is 
unchanged from that in 1995. 
We now discuss the results for each potential explanatory variable looking first at its 
effect on the participation decision and then on the decision as to how much to borrow. 
                                                                          
23. In particular, we re-estimated the participation equation excluding those who report that their only form of 
unsecured debt in 2000 is student loans or overdrafts. (This reduces the sample by 185 observations, of which 147 are 
individuals reporting all their debt in overdrafts.) These individuals might have been included as debtors in 1995, 
depending on how they interpreted the debt categories listed in the questionnaire in 1995. We re-estimated the equation 
for the unsecured debt levels, including dummy variables interacting with age for individuals with overdrafts and student 
loans. (See Table B for distribution of these instruments by age.) We also carried out the estimations using income 
dummies and results were not altered qualitatively. 
24. White males, head of household, co-habiting, with no dependent children, living in Inner London, aged 20-30, with a 
high level of education, employed, whose house is owned outright with a value below the 30th percentile in the sample 
population, with income between the 50th and 70th percentiles and no financial wealth. The head of the household in 
the BHPS is the principal owner or renter of the residence, and if there is more than one potential head, the eldest is 
selected. 
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Notes to table: 
a) The marginal effect is for a discrete change in each dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
b) Estimation is carried out for 1995 and 2000, interacting each variable with a 2000 dummy. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity. The estimation also allows for 17 regional dummies which are not reported. Percentile values are 
calculated for the total sample. The income quantiles are £1,328, £4,246, £ 7,376, £12,027 and £21,316 in 1995. They 
are uprated to 2000 prices by the RPI. Secured debt to income ratio quantiles are 0.73, 1.21, 1.71, 2.5 in 1995 and 
0.81, 1.25, 1.77 and 2.52 in 2000. Housing wealth quantiles for owner occupiers without a mortgage are £20,000, 
£30,000, £42,000, £60,000, £90,000 in 1995 and £25,000, £42,500, £60,000, £90,000, £150,000 in 2000. Financial 
wealth includes liquid and non-liquid financial assets and median values correspond to £1,560 in 1995 and £2,250 in 
2000. The category ‘other’ in labour status includes maternity leave, family care, school, long term sick and disabled and 
those on government training schemes. 
Table F: Probit model for unsecured debt market participation
No. observations 14369 9088
chi2(117) 2657.55 1758
Prob>chi2 0.000 0
Pseudo R2 0.1687 0.181
log likelihood -8080 -4783
Correctly classified 70%
variable reference group coeff std.err
mg 
effect 
(a) coeff std.err coeff std.err coeff std.err
Not head of household (head of the hhold) -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 -0.15 0.07 0.01 0.10
Female (male) 0.15 0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.31 0.07 -0.20 0.09
Divorce/separated 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.13 0.12
Widow -0.28 0.09 -0.11 -0.09 0.14 -0.37 0.10 -0.01 0.15
Never married -0.12 0.05 -0.05 0.16 0.08 -0.22 0.09 0.18 0.13
One dependent child (Nn dep. children) 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.21 0.10
Two dependent children 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.03 0.07 0.22 0.10
Three or more dep. children 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.25 0.15
Race (not white) -0.39 0.10 -0.15 0.03 0.13 -0.65 0.15 0.20 0.21
Aged 16 to 20 -0.53 0.08 -0.20 0.00 0.12
Aged 30 to 45 -0.18 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.07
Aged 45 to 60 ( aged 20 to 30) -0.33 0.06 -0.13 0.00 0.08 -0.14 0.06 0.08 0.08
Aged 60 or more -0.87 0.09 -0.30 0.20 0.13 -0.62 0.09 0.23 0.14
Medium qualification (high level) -0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.07
No qualifications -0.30 0.05 -0.12 0.02 0.08 -0.25 0.06 0.07 0.09
Self-employed (employed) -0.14 0.06 -0.06 0.19 0.09 -0.11 0.08 0.14 0.11
Unemployed -0.20 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.13 -0.08 0.12 -0.24 0.20
Retired -0.29 0.08 -0.11 -0.08 0.12 -0.27 0.09 -0.10 0.13
Full time student -0.18 0.08 -0.07 0.27 0.13 -0.02 0.31 0.01 0.43
Other  labour status -0.17 0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.14 0.07 -0.08 0.10
Income (y) <= perc 10th (p10) -0.39 0.08 -0.15 0.07 0.11 -0.28 0.11 0.07 0.17
between 10th and 30th -0.20 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.30 0.07 0.20 0.11
between 30th and 50th -0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.10
between 70th and 90th 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.07 -0.03 0.09
larger than the percentile 90th 0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.22 0.08 -0.17 0.11
Income other members (*10.000) -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
Not owner-occupier 0.38 0.09 0.15 -0.18 0.13 0.30 0.10 -0.16 0.13
Living with mortgage-debtors 0.14 0.11 0.11 -0.13 0.15 0.17 0.15 -0.07 0.20
Living with owner occupiers -0.05 0.12 0.12 -0.02 0.17 0.12 0.15 -0.19 0.21
Secured-debt/income  < 20th perc 0.32 0.10 0.10 -0.23 0.14 0.27 0.11 -0.15 0.15
between 20th  and 40th 0.36 0.10 0.10 -0.14 0.14 0.30 0.11 -0.07 0.15
between 40th and 60th 0.50 0.10 0.10 -0.18 0.14 0.52 0.12 -0.16 0.16
between 60th and 80th 0.44 0.11 0.11 -0.13 0.15 0.47 0.12 -0.08 0.17
larger than the  80th percentile 0.39 0.11 0.11 -0.12 0.15 0.51 0.12 -0.18 0.17
No mortgage, p30 < housing equity< p50 0.02 0.13 0.13 -0.22 0.19 -0.08 0.14 -0.09 0.19
between 50th and 70th 0.24 0.12 0.12 -0.34 0.17 0.21 0.12 -0.29 0.18
between 70th and 90th 0.12 0.14 0.14 -0.31 0.19 0.10 0.14 -0.22 0.20
larger than the 90th percentile 0.13 0.18 0.18 -0.30 0.25 0.03 0.18 -0.20 0.25
Positive fcial wealth < median (zero fin.wealth) 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.08
Positive fcial wealth > median -0.32 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.07 -0.21 0.06 0.02 0.08235
Positive expectations on future financial situation 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.15 0.07
constant -0.03 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.21 -0.44 0.19 0.05 0.26
(per 50th < income < 
perc 70th)
(owners-occupiers with 
no mortgage and hw < 
perc.30th)
Model 2: older than 35 year old
interacted with year 
2000
interacted with year 
2000
Model 1: Total sample
(couples)
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Notes to table: 
a) Estimation is carried out for 1995 and 2000, interacting each variable with a 2000 dummy. Standard errors are robust 
to heteroskedasticity. The estimation also allows for 17 regional dummies which are not reported. Percentile values are 
calculated for the total sample. The income quantiles are £1,328, £4,246, £ 7,376, £12,027 and £21,316 in 1995. They 
are uprated to 2000 prices by the RPI. Secured debt to income ratio quantiles are 0.73, 1.21, 1.71, 2.5 in 1995 and 
0.81, 1.25, 1.77 and 2.52 in 2000. Housing wealth quantiles for owner occupiers without a mortgage are £20,000, 
£30,000, £42,000, £60,000, £90,000 in 1995 and £25,000, £42,500, £60,000, £90,000, £150,000 in 2000. Financial 
wealth includes liquid and non-liquid financial assets and median values correspond to £1,560 in 1995 and £2,250 in 
2000. The category ‘other’ in labour status includes maternity leave, family care, school, long term sick and disabled and 
those on government training schemes. 
Table G: Cross-section regressions of unsecured debt levels 
Model 1 Aged>35
number obs 5576 3010
R-squared 0.26 0.30
Adj R-squared 0.25 0.27
coeff std.err coeff std.err coeff std.err coeff std.err
Not head of the household -0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.11 0.03 0.13 -0.09 0.18
Female -0.35 0.07 0.03 0.10 -0.54 0.12 0.09 0.16
Divorce/separated 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.17 0.16 -0.06 0.21
Widow -0.17 0.21 -0.16 0.32 -0.05 0.23 -0.20 0.33
Never married 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.26
1 dep. Child -0.18 0.08 -0.09 0.11 0.07 0.11 -0.13 0.16
2 dep. Children -0.17 0.08 -0.05 0.12 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.17
3 or more dep. Children -0.33 0.11 0.24 0.16 -0.18 0.16 0.38 0.22
Not white 0.28 0.18 -0.09 0.26 0.30 0.31 -0.23 0.41
Aged 16 to 20 -0.74 0.14 0.03 0.20
Aged 30 to 45 0.00 0.07 -0.17 0.11
Aged 45 to 60 -0.16 0.09 -0.14 0.13 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.14
Aged 60 or more -0.31 0.20 -0.21 0.28 -0.17 0.20 -0.09 0.29
Medium qualification -0.13 0.06 -0.09 0.09 -0.14 0.09 0.04 0.12
No qualifications -0.27 0.09 -0.12 0.14 -0.28 0.11 -0.03 0.16
Self employed 0.39 0.11 -0.16 0.15 0.34 0.13 0.04 0.19
Unemployed -0.38 0.14 0.27 0.23 -0.75 0.22 1.00 0.37
Retired -0.39 0.19 0.23 0.28 -0.41 0.20 0.36 0.29
Full time student 0.60 0.15 -0.05 0.25 0.64 0.52 -1.41 0.70
Other labour status -0.27 0.10 -0.13 0.14 -0.42 0.14 0.08 0.20
Income (y) <= perc 10th (p10) -0.79 0.14 0.34 0.20 -0.75 0.21 0.06 0.32
between 10th perc and 30th perc -0.47 0.10 0.01 0.15 -0.56 0.14 0.11 0.20
between 30th perc and 50th perc -0.31 0.09 0.05 0.13 -0.41 0.13 0.15 0.18
between 70th perc and 90th perc 0.40 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.23 0.12 0.27 0.16
larger than 90th perc 0.62 0.11 0.28 0.15 0.40 0.14 0.53 0.19
Income of other members (coef *104) 0.09 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.04 -0.03 0.05
Not owner-occupier 0.20 0.20 -0.21 0.27 0.03 0.22 -0.08 0.29
Living with mortgage-debtors 0.20 0.22 -0.05 0.30 0.13 0.30 -0.08 0.39
Living with owner occupiers 0.36 0.25 0.05 0.34 0.26 0.33 0.12 0.44
Secured-debt/income  < 20th perc 0.14 0.21 -0.27 0.29 0.14 0.22 -0.23 0.30
between 20th perc and 40th perc 0.35 0.21 -0.19 0.28 0.30 0.22 -0.10 0.30
between 40th perc and 60th perc 0.28 0.21 -0.17 0.28 0.35 0.23 -0.12 0.31
between 60th perc and 80th perc 0.29 0.21 -0.07 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.13 0.31
larger than 80th perc 0.53 0.21 -0.16 0.29 0.70 0.23 -0.18 0.32
No mortgage, p30 < housing equity< p50 0.22 0.30 0.07 0.42 0.18 0.32 0.14 0.44
between 50th perc and 70th perc 0.40 0.27 -0.02 0.39 0.31 0.28 0.10 0.40
between 70th perc and 90th perc 0.08 0.31 -0.13 0.44 0.03 0.32 -0.19 0.44
larger than 90th perc 0.08 0.37 0.77 0.52 0.21 0.39 0.58 0.54
Positive fcial wealth < perc 50th -0.12 0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.03 0.10 -0.12 0.14
Positive fcial wealth > perc 50th -0.11 0.08 -0.15 0.12 0.04 0.11 -0.27 0.15
Positive expectations on future fcial situation 0.23 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.33 0.09 -0.08 0.12
constant 2000 0.86 0.35 0.47 0.41
Constant 6.40 0.25 6.30 0.30
Interacted with 
year 2000
Interacted with 
year 2000
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Personal characteristics and age 
The estimation results suggest that personal characteristics have a significant effect on the 
propensity to have unsecured debt. Females are more likely to have unsecured debt, 
although the amount borrowed is significantly smaller than for men. Widows and the 
never-married are significantly less likely to have any unsecured debt. Non-whites are also 
less likely to have unsecured debt. 
The age profile effects in the participation equation are consistent with the theoretical 
life-cycle model of consumption, in that the probability of having unsecured debt decreases 
with age for all but those aged 16 to 20. Indeed, according to the estimated marginal effects, 
age is the variable that most strongly affects participation. The results suggest that the 
probability of participating in the unsecured debt market is 25 to 30 percentage points lower 
for individuals older than 60 compared with those aged 20 to 30. Those aged 16 to 20 have a 
significantly lower probability of having debt (around 20 percentage points) than the reference 
group, perhaps reflecting their economic immaturity. The age profile did not change 
significantly between 1995 and 2000. 
There is less evidence of any impact of age on the amount of unsecured debt of 
those who are borrowers. The basic results, shown as Model 1, do not suggest that the 
amount borrowed varies significantly by age, except that the under-20s borrow significantly 
less, again reflecting their economic immaturity. Nor is there any evidence that this changed 
significantly in 2000. The results are similar in Model 2 when we restrict the analysis to the 
over-35s. Age effects are discussed further in Section 5 where they appear more prominent in 
a panel estimation using the same data set. 
Income 
Differences in income also introduce significant differences in the probability of participating 
in the unsecured debt market. Individuals with income below the 30th percentile have a 
significantly lower probability of having any unsecured debt, with an even lower probability 
for those below the 10th percentile. And individuals with income between the 70th and 
90th percentiles have a significiantly higher probability of having unsecured debts, although 
this effect is not significant above the 90th percentile in Model 1. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of each income group are similar in 1995 and 2000 cannot be rejected at the 5% 
level of significance. 
There is also a strong positive relationship between the amount of unsecured debt 
held and income25. The size of coefficients shows that income is the main variable explaining 
differences in holdings of unsecured debt. Comparing the results for 1995 and 2000, there 
is little change in the estimated coefficient for those in the main body of the income 
distribution. For the lowest-income group the hypothesis of equal coefficients in 1995 
and 2000 is rejected at the 10% significance level in Model 1, suggesting that the tendency 
of the lowest income group to hold smaller amounts of unsecured debt than the 
reference group was greater in 1995 than in 2000. By contrast, the tendency of the highest 
income group to hold larger amounts of unsecured debt was accentuated in 2000 compared 
with 1995. These results are sensitive to the treatment of student loans and overdrafts. If 
we restrict the sample to the over-35s, then there is no change in the coefficient for those 
in the bottom decile of the income distribution, suggesting that the effect in the full sample 
is associated with a change in reported borrowing of the young, whether real or because of 
a change in the survey questions. But the increased borrowing by those at the top of the 
income distribution is more apparent when the sample is restricted to the over-35s. 
                                                                          
25. Alternatively, we also included income and the square of income as explanatory variables. Qualitative results were 
the same. 
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Positive financial expectations 
Positive expectations of the individual’s future financial position are also associated with a 
larger probability of participation in the unsecured debt market. The marginal effect of this 
variable is stronger in 2000 than in 1995 suggesting that the confident are more willing or able 
to borrow in 2000 than 1995. Good economic prospects are also important in determining 
the amount of unsecured debt held. Table F shows that the dummy variable for positive 
expectations about the future financial situation is highly significant and positive, with no 
apparent change in the coefficient between 1995 and 200026. 
 
Educational qualifications 
Having higher educational qualifications is associated with a higher probability of having 
unsecured debt. In particular, individuals with no educational qualifications have a probability 
of having debt that is more than 10 percentage points lower than that of high-educated ones. 
Qualification dummies also indicate that, for debt holders, the higher the educational 
qualification the larger the amount of unsecured debt held. This would be consistent 
with better qualifications making individuals both more optimistic and more confident about 
their future income levels. There is no strong evidence of a change in the link between 
qualifications and indebtedness between 1995 and 2000. 
 
Labour market status 
As regards labour status, the retired have a lower probability of having debt, by about 11 
percentage points than for the employed. This is in addition to the age effect and suggests 
that retired people are less likely to have unsecured debt at every age than those in work. 
They also tend to have less unsecured debt when they do borrow. According to Model 1, the 
unemployed also have a lower probability of participating in the unsecured debt market than 
the employed, consistent with their greater uncertainty of future income. This effect is not 
found when focusing on the over-35s suggesting that it is related to the young unemployed. 
Interestingly, the amount of unsecured borrowing by the unemployed, keeping constant all 
other characteristics, is significantly lower relative to the reference group in 1995. But in 2000, 
this effect is less apparent, especially when focusing on the over-35s. This is consistent with 
the more depressed labour market in 1995, when the unemployed would have faced more 
uncertainty about their prospects, while in 2000 unemployment might have been considered 
more of a temporary problem. Another possible interpretation would be the presence of 
looser credit restrictions for the unemployed in 2000. 
When considering the total sample, the self-employed appear less likely to borrow in 
the unsecured credit market than the employed, although there is evidence of an increase in 
this propensity between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, they tend to have more debt when they 
do borrow. This might reflect a greater general demand for finance for business reasons 
among those who participate in the market. 
                                                                          
26. At the suggestion of a referee, we also included a financial surprise variable in the estimation, but this was not 
significant. 
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Students 
The interpretation of the results for full-time students is complicated by the change in the 
wording of the question in the survey and the change in student finance regime27. They 
appear to have had a lower propensity to participate in the unsecured debt market than the 
employed in 1995, but this may be because they were not asked to include student loans in 
their answer to the question. There is a significant increase in participation in 2000 when 
student loans and overdrafts are included. Then, the estimated marginal effect of being a 
full-time student is positive but insignificant, suggesting that the likelihood of full-time students 
participating in the unsecured credit market is the same as for other individuals with the same 
characteristics. 
For those who do participate, full-time students had a relatively larger demand for 
unsecured debt than the employed, with no evidence of a change between 1995 and 2000. 
The larger demand is likely to be due to their better prospects and access to cheaper credit 
relative to their peers of similar observable circumstances. The lack of an observable change 
in the demand for unsecured debt by students relative to the reference group is surprising 
given the change in student finance regime. It suggests that the increased borrowing by 
students does not stand out when compared with others with similar characteristics in 
full-time employment. 
Housing tenure 
Housing tenure and access to secured debt affect mainly the probability of having unsecured 
debt, with a significant effect on the amount borrowed only among those with very high levels 
of secured debt relative to their incomes. Those who are renters or have a mortgage tend to 
have on average around a 15 percentage points higher probability of having unsecured debt 
than those living in houses owned outright. Differences in the ratio of mortgage debt to 
income produce a slight hump-shaped pattern with respect to the probability of having 
unsecured debt, with the highest participation being among those whose mortgage 
debt-income ratio is around the median. There is no strong evidence of any change 
between 1995 and 2000, although all categories are lower relative to the reference group. In 
terms of the amount borrowed, only those with a secured debt-income ratio above the 80th 
percentile of the distribution have significantly more unsecured debt than the reference group, 
consistent with those individuals having used up cheaper sources of funds. 
Financial wealth 
Financial wealth is also an important factor. Consistent with Banks et al. (2002), those with 
no financial wealth (reference group in the regression) are more likely to have unsecured 
debt than those with the largest financial asset holdings. However, having a moderate 
amount of financial assets is associated with a larger probability of having some unsecured 
debt, especially in 2000. In terms of the quantity of debt, the empirical results indicate that 
those with financial assets have lower amounts of unsecured debt. 
Macroeconomic factors 
According to Model 1 there is a substantial increase in the constant term in the unsecured 
debt level equation between 1995 and 2000. This implies a major increase in the overall debt 
held by reference borrowers, unconnected with any changes in the explanatory factors 
specified in the equation. Given the generally small changes in the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables between 1995 and 2000, this increase can be considered as 
generalised and probably explained by changes in the macroeconomic environment and 
credit market structure that cannot be modelled appropriately with our data set. However, 
                                                                          
27. In 1995, full-time students held nearly 50% of their debt commitments in the form of personal loans. In 2000, 
nearly 30% were overdrafts and another 30% was classified as the category something else in the show card. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0511 
it cannot be discarded that this is an effect of the change in methods of student finance and 
the BHPS questionnaire since the increase in the constant disappears when focusing only on 
those aged over-35. 
Some evidence that movements in unsecured debt spreads may have contributed 
to the generalised increase in amounts of unsecured debt held between 1995 and 2000 is 
shown in Chart 4. As can be seen, spreads differ largely by type of debt instrument and 
the reduction of spreads during the second half of the 1990s does not affect all 
instruments equally. While the interest rate spread on personal loans (of more than £10,000) 
has fallen sharply from around 10 to 6 percentage points, this contrasts with a fall from 12 
to 10 percentage points in the case of overdrafts. As regards the maturity of unsecured debt, 
the proportion of personal loans with an original maturity greater than four years increased 
from 22% in 1995 to 35% in 2000. The proportion of loans with an original maturity between 
one and four years decreased from 64% to around 50%. Whether this is a demand or supply 
effect is unclear, but it has allowed individuals to sustain higher levels of debt without 
increasing regular repayments of debt. 
Chart 4: Spread between unsecured debt interest rates and the retail bank base rate: personal 
loans, overdrafts and credit cards (quoted interest rates)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Bank of England. 
 
Explanatory variables 
A useful way of summarising the estimation results is to show the fitted value of unsecured 
debt conditional on having such debt. Chart 5 shows the predicted age and income profile 
of unsecured debt levels for the reference group. In contrast with the simple patterns that 
might be present in the raw data, the regression approach makes it possible to hold constant 
all other factors (such as housing tenure, labour market status) that might also vary with 
income and age. A shallow hump-shaped profile of unsecured debt holdings with respect to 
age is apparent. The profile with respect to income is fairly flat up to about median income, 
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unsecured debt is sharply increasing in income beyond that. Chart 5 emphasises the shift in 
unsecured debt between 1995 and 2000 at all ages and income levels, although the 
increases are significantly lower and statistically not significant according to the estimation 
results when focusing only on those aged over-35. 
 
 
 
 
 
While the increase in total unsecured debt between 1995 and 2000 could be a 
generalised phenomenon, the evolution of individual characteristics found to be relevant to 
debt market participation still contributes to the overall increase. Table D showed unsecured 
debt sample weights of different population groups by some of the key variables determining 
unsecured debt market participation and amount of debt held. As can be seen, there are 
some important shifts in the population characteristics that might have affected the stock of 
aggregate debt. In particular, the shift in the number of individuals towards higher income 
groups (in real terms) is quite marked. There is also an increase in the proportion of individuals 
with high qualifications from 29% in 1995 to 38% in 2000. These two characteristics are 
positively related to both participation and amount of debt and so help to explain the increase 
in the amount of unsecured debt held by the sample as a whole. Nevertheless, their 
quantitative impact is small relative to the predicted change in the amount borrowed per 
individual. For example, the predicted weighted average debt level for 20-30 year olds with 
income in the 50th-70th percentile increased by 128% between 1995 and 2000, of which 
only about 8% is due to the increase in qualifications of this group. Similarly the general 
improvement in income would account for around 10% of the increase in aggregate debt. 
 
Chart 5: Predicted unsecurd debt by age and income (for reference group)
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5 Changes in levels of unsecured debt: panel estimation  
The preceding analysis has made no use of the fact that the same individuals are present in 
both the 1995 and 2000 samples, so that their behaviour may be tracked over time. In this 
section we discuss evidence on changes in the borrowing of the individuals appearing in both 
samples. With a longer panel, this would be the preferred method of analysis so long as the 
model coefficients are not changing over time, as it purges individual specific effects from the 
estimation. But with the very short panel available, this approach is used here to check that 
the assumptions underlying the cross-section estimation are not too restrictive. 
Table H shows that despite the apparent stability in unsecured debt market 
participation and general increase in the amount borrowed, there is considerable change 
in the position of individual borrowers as they move into and out of debt. Among those in 
the top quartile of debt in 1995, 41% of them were still highly indebted in 2000, but 35% of 
them had reduced their debt to zero. There appears to be more persistence at low debt levels 
in that 78% of people with no unsecured debt in 1995 still had no debt in 2000, whereas 
only 8% of them had moved to the top quartile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table H: Unsecured debt transitions between 1995 and 2000 
Transition matrix: number of individuals by debt levels in 1995 and 2000  (*)
1995
2000
no debt
debt< 1st 
quartile
between 
quartile 1 
and 2
between 
quartile 2 
and 3
debt>3rd 
quartile Total 00
no debt 3,119 310 268 213 247 4,157
debt< 1st quartile 255 140 94 59 39 587
between quartile 1 and 2 219 86 110 90 76 581
between quartile 2 and 3 207 58 85 117 121 588
debt>3rd quartile 197 49 84 117 219 666
Total 95 3,997 643 641 596 702 6,579
1995
2000
no debt
debt< 
percent25th
p25th<debt
< p50th
p50th<debt< 
p75th p75th>debt
no debt 78% 48% 42% 36% 35%
debt< percentile25th (*) 5% 17% 10% 7% 4%
between 25th and 50th 4% 11% 14% 10% 6%
between 50th and 75th 6% 11% 16% 17% 14%
<percentile 75th 8% 13% 19% 31% 41%
Total 95 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Distribution of individuals in the panel by debt levels in 1995 and 2000               (as % 
of Total 95)
 (*) Debt percentiles correspond to £180, £650 and £2000 in 1995, and £400, £1500 and £4000 in 
2000. This matrix includes only those individuals in the sample in both 1995 and 2000.
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The cross section estimation reported in section four is motivated by the general 
reduced form debt function (3.3). Differencing (3.3), assuming no change in the coefficients 
across the two years, eliminates the individual specific effects and gives: 
itttitittittit rcZbYgcYfD ε∆ϕ∆∆∆∆∆ ++−++= )()()(  (5.1) 
Thus, in general terms, the change in the unsecured debt of an individual responds 
to changes in economic circumstances (reflected here in the income term), changes in 
personal characteristics, including a general age effect as the individual moves further along 
the life-cycle and changes in macroeconomic conditions (reflected here in the change in 
interest rates). 
We estimate this equation using the change in the level of unsecured debt as the 
dependent variable. But the right-hand side variables are not simply the differences of the 
variables included in the cross section regressions. In the cross-section, we used a banded 
income variable to pick up possible non-linear effects. Here we include the change in income 
allowing for a non-linear effect. We also include the change in educational qualifications28, in 
labour status, in financial wealth and in the outstanding mortgage stock. The changes in 
labour status are considered with different dummy variables indicating whether the individual 
found a job, became unemployed or other combinations of the different labour status 
considered previously. Changes in the mortgage stock are split into four categories. We 
consider separately the change in the mortgage of those increasing the stock of secured 
debt, the change of those decreasing the mortgage and dummy variables for those who have 
an unchanged positive mortgage and those who have no mortgage in 1995 and 2000. 
We also include age dummies to capture the stage of the life cycle and a dummy variable 
to consider whether the individual expects an improvement in his financial situation29. 
The constant term picks up the effect of general changes in macroeconomic and credit 
market conditions relevant to the reference group, who consist of individuals between the age 
of 20 and 30 in 2000 who are employed in both years. To some extent this also captures a 
life-cycle effect to the extent that the reference group are of an age where they are expected 
to be increasing their indebtedness in line with the hump-shaped profile shown in Chart 5. 
The estimation results are presented in Table I. Two adjustments are included to deal 
with the change in survey question. In the first case, we include a dummy variable for those 
with overdrafts and student loans in 2000. In the second case, we exclude individuals with 
student loans and overdrafts in 2000. 
 
                                                                          
28. This variable is the change in a variable that takes the value 3 for high educational level, 2 for medium and 1 for no 
qualifications. 
29. Note that we do not include the change in age as would be strictly consistent with differencing (3.3). 
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The results are consistent with those found in the cross-sectional analysis and 
suggest that the assumptions underlying it are not too restrictive, although the effect of age is 
much more apparent here once the individual specific fixed effects have been differenced 
out30. Those aged between 45 and 60 reduced their unsecured debt by over £500 more than 
those between 20 and 30, while those over 60 reduced their debt by over £700 more than 
their younger counterparts. 
The increase in income is statistically significant in explaining the increase in 
unsecured debt. When separating this effect between low and high-income individuals31, this 
effect is larger for those with low incomes in 1995, consistent with a non-linear effect. 
As in the cross-section results, there is clear evidence of the effect of expectations 
on unsecured borrowing. Expectations of a better financial situation have a significant positive 
impact. Similarly, an increase in educational qualifications raises unsecured borrowing. 
Changes in the labour market position of the individual also have an impact 
on borrowing. The effect of being unemployed in both 1995 and 2000 appears to offset the 
general upward trend in borrowing, although this effect is not precisely determined 
                                                                          
30. Note that we keep the same age groups as in previous analysis. Since age dummies enter contemporaneously in the 
panel equation the youngest individuals are 20 years old, that is, they were 16 years old in 1995. 
31. High (low) income individuals are those above (below) the median income distribution of 1995. 
Table I: Panel estimation for the change in debt levels 
Dependent variable Dt-Dt-1
year 2000 2000 (a) 2000 (b)
Number of obs. 4875 0 2328
F test 10.4 13.3 7.6
Prob F test 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.095 0.149 0.063
Root MSE 2487 2411 2328
explanatory varaibles reference group coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat
Increase in income (high income individuals in 1995) 0.02 3.09 0.02 3.24 0.02 3.21
Increase in income (low income individuals in 1995) 0.04 3.03 0.02 2.15 0.03 2.41
Expectations of better financial situation 415.35 4.06 344.91 3.45 316.13 3.18
Increase in educational qualification 472.27 3.67 276.00 2.31 148.10 1.25
20 years old in 2000 (20 to 30 years old) 380.54 0.45 438.70 0.85 -168.08 -0.59
30 to 45 years old -297.93 -2.11 -118.39 -0.85 -157.15 -1.15
45 to 60 years old -635.94 -4.12 -406.02 -2.66 -484.90 -3.23
Older tan 60 -669.08 -3.79 -423.77 -2.43 -504.85 -2.90
Becoming unemployed in 2000
(employed in 95 and 
00) -258.25 -0.77 -249.94 -0.79 -333.04 -1.09
Uemployed in 1995 and 2000 -600.52 -2.14 -506.17 -1.86 -530.68 -1.92
Becoming employed/self employed in 2000 458.88 2.88 135.29 0.89 39.63 0.27
From self-empl to employed -435.41 -1.60 -436.64 -1.61 -432.14 -1.60
From employed to sel-employ -104.06 -0.25 -98.49 -0.24 -126.76 -0.30
Self-employed in 1995 and 2000 317.98 1.32 324.90 1.35 297.04 1.23
Retired in 2000 -159.86 -1.21 -195.04 -1.49 -221.72 -1.69
Full time student in 2000 538.75 1.20 -648.03 -2.08 -964.57 -6.69
Other -298.27 -3.01 -337.48 -3.46 -411.00 -4.45
Change in mortgage stock (if positive) 0.01 1.52 0.01 1.26 0.01 1.26
Change in mortgage stock (if negative) -0.01 -1.44 -0.01 -1.44 -0.01 -1.45
No change in mortgage stock (positive mortgage) -174.41 -1.00 -166.40 -0.96 -140.07 -0.81
No change in mortgage stock (zero mortgage) -83.55 -0.81 -72.29 -0.72 -45.31 -0.45
Changes in financial wealth -0.01 -1.85 -0.01 -1.72 -0.01 -1.68
Changes in net wealth (dummies) 6.04 0.19 13.23 0.42 20.96 0.67
Constant 1066.22 4.74 800.36 3.65 973.74 4.54
Individuals with overdrafts and st. loans 4350.89 10.81
(a) including a dummy for individuals with overdrafts and student loans.
(b) excluding individuals with overdrafts and student loans.
exc. Individuals with 
overdrafts and st.loans
dummy for overdrafts 
and st.loans
Note: Income gearings percentiles correspond to 9%, 13% and 20%. Median value of financial wealth is £2,250. Region 2 includes South East 
excluding London, South West and  East Anglia. Region 3, East and west Midlands, Region4, Greater Manchester, Merseyside and rest of the 
North West. Region 5, South Yourkshier, West Yorkshire, Rest of Yorks and Humber and Tyne & Wear and Rest of the North. Region 6, 
Wales and Scotland.
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statistically. Becoming employed or self-employed (from being without work) has a significant 
positive effect on the change in debt. 
The impact of changes in the secured debt market is again surprising in that there 
is evidence of increasing unsecured debt among those reducing their mortgage32. This is 
consistent with the cross-section evidence that some unsecured borrowing is being 
undertaken by those who have unused secured debt capacity. 
As with the cross-section results, there is clear evidence of a general increase in 
unsecured debt captured in the constant term in the equation, worth £600 per individual. This 
is close to the median increase between 1995 and 2000 of £800 for those with unsecured 
debt in the whole sample, indicating that this factor is most important in explaining the general 
increase. This effect is present even when individuals with student loans or overdrafts are 
excluded from the comparison.  
 
                                                                          
32. Note that a reduction in mortgages is included as a negative increase. Hence, the negative coefficient implies an 
increase in unsecured debt. 
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6 Conclusions 
The rapid rise in unsecured borrowing since the mid-1990s has raised concerns about the 
ability of households to repay these loans. While aggregate information is useful in tracking 
changes in the average size of loans, it cannot reveal whether shifts in the amount of 
borrowing by individual households are increasing their overall level of risk. One possibility is 
that unsecured borrowing is increasingly being undertaken by high-risk households. 
In order to assess these risks and how they have changed over time, this paper 
examines survey evidence on the determinants and distribution of unsecured debt. It uses 
waves 5 and 10 of the BHPS to examine the determinants of participation in the unsecured 
debt market, the amount borrowed and changes between 1995 and 2000, the years in which 
the surveys were carried out. The analysis suggests that there is no strong evidence that 
borrowing is concentrated among high-risk households or that the determinants of borrowing 
have changed substantially between 1995 and 2000. 
There is no evidence from the BHPS that participation in the unsecured debt market 
rose between 1995 and 2000. In both years, around 39% of people claimed to have some 
debt in this form. Of course, these need not be the same people, the longitudinal nature of 
the BHPS suggests that 35% of the most indebted quartile in 1995 had no unsecured debt 
in 2000. But the evidence suggests that there has been no substantial change in the factors 
which determine whether an individual is likely to have unsecured debt or not. 
In line with standard life-cycle considerations, econometric analysis indicates that the 
main determinant of the participation decision is the age of the borrower, with 20 to 30 year 
olds being most likely to borrow unsecured. Other statistically significant factors are income, 
economic prospects, qualifications, job status, housing status and the extent of mortgage 
borrowing. In general, individuals who would appear to be high-risk borrowers are less likely 
to have any unsecured debt. 
While there is no clear statistical evidence of a change in the determinants of 
participation in the unsecured credit market between 1995 and 2000 there was, though, a 
striking increase in the amount of debt held by borrowers between these two years. 
According to econometric estimates, the main determinant of the level of unsecured 
borrowing of borrowers is the level of individual income. The other statistically significant 
determinants of the amount of borrowing are economic prospects, qualifications, job 
status, housing status and the extent of mortgage borrowing. But, as with the participation 
decision, there is little evidence of a major change in the importance of these determinants 
between 1995 and 2000, although there does appear to have been a slight increase in the 
relative borrowing of those with high incomes. Instead, the main change between these years 
is that there has been an increase in the amount borrowed throughout the distribution. 
This suggests that factors affecting all current and potential borrowers, regardless of 
their personal characteristics, were most important in explaining the rise in unsecured debt 
between 1995 and 2000. Notwithstanding, the increase might be biased upward due to the 
change in the survey questionnaire. 
Thus the rise in unsecured borrowing appears not to have been concentrated within 
poor risk groups but to have been a general phenomenon affecting those likely to be 
borrowers to a similar extent. While it is not possible on the basis of the information available 
to explain the cause of this shift, it is consistent with lower rates of interest on unsecured 
debt. According to the theory outlined in this paper, lower rates on unsecured debt would 
raise both the unsecured and secured borrowing of those unable to borrow as much as they 
would like at secured interest rates, without encouraging further borrowing by those who are 
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unlikely to participate in the unsecured market. This would improve the welfare of those who 
had been constrained by enabling them to spread their spending more smoothly over time. In 
this sense, the increase in unsecured debt has been beneficial. 
Of course, more unsecured debt involves greater risks even if it is not concentrated 
among high risk groups. Some individuals do have very high levels of debt in relation to their 
income that expose them to the risk that they will not be able to repay. But there is no 
evidence that this situation worsened between 1995 and 2000. 
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